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As good as it gets? The new Sandinismo and the co-option of 
emancipatory rural politics in Nicaragua 
 
Santiago Ripoll 
 
Abstract 
Daniel Ortega’s electoral victory in 2006 brought hope that the re-vamped Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN) party would reverse neoliberal policies in rural Nicaragua. Yet, 11 years 
on, with the new FSLN firmly in power, such a reversal has not materialised. There is higher 
investment in agriculture and a deeper role for the State in creating safety nets for the poor, yet the 
economy remains virtually the same: an export-led, agricultural commodity-based, free-trade 
economy open to foreign direct investment and imports. A dominant media presence and the co-option 
of electoral institutions have allowed for Ortega to be re-elected, but it is the alliance with past 
military, political and economic adversaries that cements the governments’ power, together with 
significant public support. Contradictions are emerging between the public socialist and anti-
imperialist rhetoric and progressive environmental and social legislation; and on the other hand, the 
realities of wealth accumulation, land evictions and environmental destruction. Protests and dissent, 
even from within the ranks of the FSLN are met with increased authoritarianism, either through direct 
or indirect violence, bureaucratic control or political and social ostracism. In rural areas, the FSLN 
have engaged in agrarian populism, obscuring class divisions in rural areas in their discourse. Some 
public investments reach poor and small-scale farmers, but government funds, tax incentives and 
credit are biased towards extractives (mining and wood) and large-scale commodity production and 
trade (coffee, sugar cane, grains). A change of party in government would do little to change these 
policies, and change from within is a challenge. Emancipatory action in Nicaragua should take the 
form of a grassroots social platform that makes the FSLN accountable to their historic constituencies: 
showing that not all agriculturalists are the same, breaking down the categories within ‘rural people’; 
and proposing progressive policies that resonate with and mobilise the poorest citizens. 
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Introduction 
When Ortega was elected in 2006 a wind of hope swept the Nicaraguan countryside. After 16 years 
under Liberal Party rule, dominated by unfettered markets and investment away from the countryside, 
there was an expectation that the re-vamped Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) party 
would reverse neoliberal policies. Yet, 11 years on, with Daniel Ortega firmly in power, such reversal 
has not materialised. Whilst certainly there has been a higher investment in agriculture and deeper role 
for the State in creating safety nets for the poor, the Nicaraguan agrarian political economy remains 
virtually the same: an export-led, agricultural commodity-based, free-trade economy open to foreign 
direct investment and imports (Marti i Puig and Baumeister, 2017). The neoSandinista government has 
cemented its power by successfully balancing the alliance with traditional/conservative and FSLN-
linked elites with the immediate needs of their poorer constituencies (Spalding, 2013: 40).  
 
Similarly to the ‘pink tide’ left wing governments in other Latin American countries, the new FSLN 
government has reversed the dismantling of the State, and public support to the countryside has 
steadily increased. The new FSLN has also created space for socially diverse groups in Nicaragua, 
legislating to enhance indigenous and afrodescendants’ rights. Yet, on the other hand, alliances with 
the Catholic and Evangelical churches have meant regressive legislation in terms of sexual and 
reproductive rights. 
 
What does this mean in terms of emancipatory rural politics? Is this as good as it gets? A change of 
party in government would be unlikely to signify into a change of economic policy. Change from 
within isn’t straightforward either. The Sandinista party has constantly co-opted progressive 
movements for social change by virtue of incorporating them. A ‘big tent’ politics has applied to 
policy discourse, all agricultural models are incorporated (even if they may be contradictory): food 
policy caters simultaneously for “poor and decapitalised small farmers and small landowners, as well 
as “agro-industry” (MAGFOR 2009). The FSLN, have succeeded in maintaining the support of their 
poorest constituencies by virtue of engaging in agrarian populism- in which ‘the people’ in agriculture 
are all the same and worthy of support, negating the agrarian differentiation that occurs within it: 
landless labourers, land renters, subsistence farmers, commercial farmers, plantation farmers and so 
on. Some financing and government projects do go to small-scale farmers, but the means of 
production are concentrated in the hands of elites, which emphasise extractives (mining and wood) 
and commodity production (coffee, grains) over other forms of sustainable or equitable production 
(Marti i Puig and Baumeister,2017). 
 
What can be done about it? How to bring to the fore emancipatory rural politics in Nicaragua? As I 
argue later, dissent in Nicaragua will have  to come in a the form of a positive and constructive 
platform that proposes alternatives, on two fronts: firstly by showing that not all agriculturalists are the 
same, breaking down the categories within ‘rural people’; and secondly through proposing progressive 
policies that resonate with and mobilise the poorest FSLN constituencies. The FSLN government still 
depends on the trust of campesinos1 and poor urbanites in order to continue in power.  
 
Sources, anonymity and positionality 
This paper is based on four sources: (i) a review of the recent literature on Nicaraguan political 
economy and changes in rural lives, (ii) my doctoral research on subsistence campesino farmers’ 
livelihoods in the Matagalpa Highlands; (iii) a selection of analysis and recommendations yielded by 
the jurado campesino (farmers jury) as part of the Nicaraguan component of the Carasso and New 
Field Foundation- funded project “transitions to agroecological food systems”; and (iv) a small 
number of interviews with agriculture and food policy experts in the country. It is important to 
highlight here that the argument on authoritarian populism in contemporary Nicaragua I make in this 
paper is mine alone, and the ideas that I put forward do not emerge from the aforementioned project, 
except on the occasions when I explicitly indicate it. As I will show in Section 4, the political spaces 
                                                 
1 Campesino/a roughly translates as peasant, landworker or small-scale farmer 
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for dissent in rural politics are shrinking. Researchers and practitioners whom I contacted for the 
interviews are concerned of the consequences that speaking openly against the government might have 
on their careers, the status of their organisations or their residency status. We decided together to keep 
their contributions anonymised.  
 
Section 1. Sandinistas 2.0. The new populist politics in Nicaragua. 
Agro-export economies and political power 
Nicaragua has been an agro-export economy since it was forced into it by the Spanish colonial powers 
and the British traders in the Caribbean Coast. Since then, power has emerged from the control over 
the production and trade of these commodities. Caudillos, strong men, have traditionally rooted their 
power in agricultural economies, together with military and popular support.  
 
The Somoza dynasty2 (1937-1979) thrived on this economic model in contemporary Nicaragua. The 
dictatorship wisely read the global scene and the impetus of globalisation together with the weakness 
of his adversaries. Somoza became an ally to US intervention, and succeeded in luring in economic 
elites to his sphere of power. Somoza’s family purchased or expropriated businesses and land 
wholesale, sharply increasing their personal wealth. Nicaragua became, de facto, their own hacienda. 
The Somozas also understood the importance of consent, and together with fierce authoritarian 
violence, he would engage in “assistentialist” politics, giving handouts to the poor, and a semblance of 
democracy. 
 
The first regime to attempt to bring in both democracy and to imagine a different economic and 
political model was in Revolutionary Nicaragua under the FSLN (1979-1990). After ousting Somoza, 
the FSLN implemented a mixed economy with a coexistence of State-owned and private owned 
enterprises, under an import-substitution regime. Somoza’s and their allies’ assets, including land were 
nationalised and then reconfigured either as State enterprises or cooperatives, in which people would 
have guaranteed labour rights and/or farmland in a cooperative. Campesinos along the agricultural 
frontier, many of which were smallholders not incorporated in cooperatives, would not receive the 
benefits in agricultural inputs and credit, whilst at the same time be affected by the grain market 
controls. On the other hand, prices controls ensured a minimum price to ensure livelihoods and 
protected local agricultural industries from imports. In the second half of the 1980s land started being 
distributed to individual households, in response to grassroots resistance to collective ownership.  
 
During the liberal years (1990- 2006), under the guidance of the Washington consensus, State policy 
reverted to openness to trade and flow of credit solely to large export farms. Markets were 
deregulated, imported grains flooded the countryside, rural development banks were privatised and 
credit to small and medium producers disappeared (Rueda Estrada, 2013). Service to campesinos 
including the provision of inputs and extension services were severely reduced. The aim was to keep 
only the “efficient” producers in the market, assuming cheap labour would move to resource 
extraction, tourism or export processing zones (maquilas) (Holt-Gimenez, 2006). In agriculture, the 
focus continued to be on traditional low value commodities like coffee, basic grains (corn, beans, 
sorghum) and cattle (Baumeister, 2009: 411). The lack of technical and financial support made 
producers unable to increase their productivity and compete in an open market global economy (Rueda 
Estrada, 2013: 183).  
 
Daniel Ortega had run for President in 1996 and 2001 fronting the FSLN, but failed to win the 
elections, and the Liberal Conservative Party ruled until its demise in 2006. That year, a decade and a 
half of structural adjustment, hollowing of the State and high-level corruption scandals, the electorate 
voted the FSLN back into power. Despite reaching power with only 39 percent of the votes, in the 
                                                 
2 The Somoza’s dictatorship spanned over 6 decades: Anastasio Somoza Garcia (1937-1956), succeeded by his 
elder son Luis Somoza (1956- 1963), in turn succeeded by his younger brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
(1963-1979) who was ousted by the Sandinista revolution.  
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following decade, the FSLN has consolidated itself as the hegemonic political power in Nicaragua. I 
explain below how this has been achieved. 
 
Elite populism: not a contradiction in Nicaragua 
The key characteristic of the neo-Sandinista capture and reproduction of political power is the 
centrality of elite alliances. The FSLN’s return to government in 2007 and the stability and continuity 
of its rule has been guaranteed through alliances with old military and political adversaries, alliances 
with the orthodox Catholic Church, and alliances with national and international capitalist elites.  
 
A web of elite alliances 
Ortega’s victory in the presidential elections in 2006 was made possible by the pact that he made with 
Arnaldo Aleman the leader of the main opposition party, the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC 
acronym in Spanish) in 19963. To consolidate two party politics, they agreed to amend the constitution 
to allow for parties with support under 40 percent to be able to obtain the presidency if they received 
over 35 percent of the vote and over 5 percent ahead from their nearest competitor. Before that, a 40 
percent was the minimum requisite.  Further, the constitutional amendments also enabled Ortega to 
run for a third term as president when the original text only allowed for two terms. In exchange for 
these constitutional concessions, Aleman gained immunity against prosecution for crimes for fraud 
and embezzlement. Thanks to this alliance, Ortega became president with 39 percent of the votes, and 
is now in his fifth term (two terms in the revolution and 3 terms after 2006). Ortega’s electoral victory 
banked on the break-up of the Constitutionalist Liberal party (PLC) into two irreconcilable factions 
(the PLC and what would coalesce into the National Liberal Alliance (ALN)). These two factions 
obtained a combined 55 percent of the vote in the 2006 election, but their now longstanding schism led 
to Ortega’s victory in the 2006 elections4. 
 
Another important alliance was established with old military adversaries. To put the armed conflict 
that raged in the 1980s behind for good, Ortega’s candidacy included Jaime Morales Carazo (leader of 
the Contra party Nicaraguan Democratic Force FDN) as the vice-president, and after victory a 
“Government of Reconciliation and National Unity” was created. This alliance was sealed by the 
transfer of land and property to Contra commanders all around the country, after the 2006 election.  
 
The Sandinista revolution of 1979 was imbued with a sense of religious sacrifice and abnegation, 
which was rooted in grassroots church activism, an iglesia popular “church of the people” which ran 
against church hierarchy. Since 2004 Ortega has allied himself to the revolution’s greatest critic, the 
Cardinal Obando y Bravo (now his spiritual counsel and political ally (Salinas Maldonado, 2009)), as 
well as the evangelist church. FSLN slogans are now deeply messianic and religious, in which 
Nicaragua is “Christian, Socialist and in Solidarity” and the FSLN is bendecido, prosperado y en 
victorias “blessed prosperous and victorious”. The price for this alliance has been regressive 
legislation on sexual and reproductive rights, through which therapeutic abortions are illegal (Jarquin, 
2016). 
 
As I will show in more detail in the following section on rural politics, a fundamental alliance has 
occurred between the FSLN and the country’s economic elites. These elites include not only 
traditional wealthy business families, but also new economic elites (landowners and businessmen and 
women) that have arisen within the Sandinista ranks since the end of the revolution in the 1990s5. As I 
                                                 
3 The constitutional amendments were incorporated in 2000. 
4 In fact this schism was rooted in the influence of the pact with the FSLN. In 2005, there was distancing 
between those liberals who supported the Aleman- Ortega pact, and those who supported President Bolanos. The 
“Alemanistas” collaborated with the FSLN in transferring executive powers from the Presidency to the National 
Assembly, undermining President Bolanos. In response to these divisions, Bolanos decided to create a new party 
APRE, who ran as part of the National Liberal Alliance (Close, 2009; Martí i Puig, 2009). 
5 Some would argue that the origin of these new capitalists was in the distribution of State assets to FSLN cadres, 
collaborators and grassroots constituents during the wave of privatisation that preceded the handover of power in 
1990 (Cuadra Lira, 2016b). In fear that these assets would be restituted to previous Somocista owners, the FSLN 
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will show below, the Superior Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP), the organisation that 
represents wealthy capitalists in the country, works closely with the government at a technical and 
political level (Interview 4). 
 
Despite public speeches against global capitalism and imperialism, alliances with global capital have 
been established. Despite rhetoric, Nicaragua is a model recipient of IMF funds, meeting the fiscal 
requirements. Unchanged since the Liberal years, public expenditure is contained, and regressive 
taxation has continued. As in other developing countries, adherence to this framework leaves little 
room for manoeuvre for public investment and often solely allows for the implementation of basic 
safety nets in cooperation with development donors. Until recently, the funds that came from 
Venezuela through the ALBA initiative6 (allowed by the IMF although the funds were not accountable 
to the Asamblea Nacional (Parliament)) gave some leeway for the government to carry out public 
spending.  
 
Nicaragua has succeeded to provide a friendly environment for Foreign Direct Investment.. The World 
Bank awarded PRONicaragua, the government agency in charge of foreign investments, the “world’s 
top investment facilitator” prize, becoming the first developing country to do so. Generous tax breaks 
and export processing zones have enabled foreign investments in mining, apparel, forestry, tourism, 
call centres and agriculture (palm oil, sugar cane, cattle, etc.).  
 
Public support and safety nets 
These ‘unholy’ alliances fly in the face of the ideology of the revolutionary FSLN, who saw many of 
these elites as their opponents and even their enemies. Despite this, the public support for the 
government and the current political situation is high. According to the latest Latinobarometro 7 
conducted in 2017, out of the Latin American countries, Nicaraguans are first in thinking that their 
government rules for the benefit of all the people (52 percent of respondents), and it is the lowest in 
Latin America in stating that the government rules for a small number of “powerful groups” (43 
percent of respondents). When asked explicitly about their approval of Ortega’s government, the 
approval rates are the highest in Latin America, with 67 percent of respondents. 
 
However this support of the government does not necessarily translate exactly into electoral gains. The 
support of the neo-Sandinista government, has peaked at around 40 percent of the electorate (Jarquin, 
2016). The electoral results have consistently improved since 2006, but this is a product of increased 
abstention (48-52 percent abstained from voting in the November 2017 municipal elections which 
were overwhelmingly won by the FSLN). 
 
Popular support is achieved with policies such as the provision of free healthcare and education. 
Public support amongst the traditional Sandinista constituencies of the poor and marginalised is also 
achieved through a quick comparison with the 16 years of liberal rule, in which poor people 
(particularly campesinos) received little support. The safety nets that have been put in place by the 
FSLN since 2006, in terms of subsidised food for the urban poor, or development programmes 
directed at rural small-scale farmers, signal a presence from the State towards which Sandinista 
supporters feel indebted. These safety nets have mitigated the impact of the continuation of neoliberal 
policies. A great part of these safety nets were covered by Venezuelan funds. The problem arises now 
that the Venezuelan economy is failing and these financial flows have stopped. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
swiftly privatised substantial amounts of  State property, including houses, agrarian industries and land (Martí i 
Puig & Baumeister, 2017), some of them ending in the hands of “the top political and military leadership” (2017: 
386).    
6 ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, a Latin American and Caribbean integration 
body “sustained on principles of solidarity, social justice, cooperation and economic complementarity.” It 
integrates 12 Latin American and it has been primarily led by Cuba and Venezuela. 
7 The Latinobarometro is an annual public opinion survey that involves some 20,000 interviews in 18 Latin Amer
ican countries, representing more than 600 million people. It observes the development of democracies, economi
es and societies, using indicators of attitude, opinion and behaviour http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp.  
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My experience working within a rural population with high Sandinista support is that grassroot 
activists and supporters perceive a continuity between the revolutionary FSLN and the current party in 
government, and thus Ortega’s government banks on the symbolic capital of the social justice 
struggles of the 1980s.  In Rodgers words, the new FSLN has succeeded in selling “new wines in old 
bottles” (Rodgers, 2006). The neo-Sandinista government has also succeeded in creating a feeling of 
prosperity and progress (58 percent of respondents of the Latinobarometro feel the country will be 
better off in the next year and 61 percent that their personal finances will improve in the same time- 
both the 2nd highest rankings in Latin America). Further, together with Costa Rica, has succeeded in 
avoiding the “maelstrom of violence” that has crippled other Central American countries economies 
(Rocha, 2008). According to the World Bank, poverty levels have decreased from 48.3 percent in 
2005 to 24.9 percent in 2016. That said, despite these positive changes, 37 percent of respondents 
declared to be food insecure, and 59 percent declared that they could not make ends meet with their 
current incomes. 
 
It is also the use of legislation and policy as discourse –rather than reality- which is particularly 
powerful in generating public support. With the exception of the sexual and reproductive rights laws, 
the legislative landscape of Nicaragua is one of the most progressive in the region. Social, cultural and 
environmental rights are enshrined in law and government discourse is progressive and inclusive. As I 
will show below in the case of rural areas, the reality is very different, because this progressive 
legislation is not implemented (e.g. in the face of environmental destruction) or is contradicted by 
other government practices (e.g. indigenous people have acquired recognition in law, but their 
livelihoods are simultaneously being destroyed by land grabs and the palm industry under the 
protection of the government). Development programmes –either directly through the government or 
in collaboration with international development donors - ensure the government is seen as ‘working 
for the people’, but the limited funds that are available mean that they have little power to transform 
people’s livelihoods.  
 
Curating dissent 
Paradoxically, a majority of Nicaraguans seems to be satisfied with the democratic process. The 
country is ranked second in Latin America in satisfaction with democracy after Uruguay (57 percent 
Uruguay and 52 percent Nicaragua). Yet the reality is that the Pacto with Aleman and the 
constitutional amendments that took place, have given the FSLN a disproportionate weight in crucial 
institutions for democracy such as the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) and the Supreme Court of 
Justice (CSJ). This has enabled the re-election of Ortega, and in the recent presidential elections, it 
disavowed opposition parties to organise and campaign (Jarquin, 2016). It is difficult to gauge if there 
has been electoral fraud. Whilst this view is supported by a multitude of national and international 
academics, the view of the international observer Organisation of American States (OEA), has been 
that the Presidential election of 2011 was indeed flawed (McConnell, 2014), however they have given 
their seal of approval (with caveats in the forms of recommendations) to the other elections in which 
the FSLN has been victorious. Whether due to a weak opposition or fraud, the reality is that the FSLN 
systematically comes on top, and participating in elections is no longer perceived as a means to enact 
dissent. In fact, quite the opposite. In the latest municipal campaigns, the press emphasised the lack of 
voting as a form of protest, and the government has perceived the increase in abstentions  as a form of  
“confrontation” (Espinoza, 2017).  
 
The network of elite alliances bound to the FSLN rule control the majority of media channels. 
(Rothschuh Villanueva, 2016: 195). The FSLN has also withheld State advertisement funds to 
dissuade dissent in newspapers.  What is important here is that despite this encroachment, there are 
still a small number of media spaces allowed for dissent, the Confidencial TV programme and 
website, or the newspaper La Prensa. Similarly famous dissidents, like the authors Gioconda Belli, or 
the commandante are not censored. In fact these handful of voices of dissent are central to a portrayal 
of Nicaragua as a country where there is free speech (ibid; Interview 1).  
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However, those dissident voices that do not have celebrity status are indeed under attack. In order for 
an individual to apply for a public service job, participate in a State-sponsored venture, or receive 
government funding, a letter of endorsement from the party is required. This aval does not come easy 
when the person or organisation has a view opposing current government policy. Similarly, foreign 
residents fear their residency rights removed, and a new immigration procedure allows critical foreign 
academics to be turned away at the border (e.g. in the field of democratic governance), as well as 
deport researchers in politically sensitive fields (The Transoceanic Canal, chronic kidney disease 
amongst sugar cane workers, etc.) (Interview 1, Interview 4, Interview 5). 
 
Similarly, public protest is legal. Yet the police has been heavy-handed in recent demonstrations 
around the rights of pensioners, women’s rights and against the construction of the new Transoceanic 
Canal. There is evidence of the use of Sandinista youth (some of them recruited directly from street 
gangs) to spark violence to break up legitimate demonstrations. These young people are armed and 
resourced by the party (Rocha, 2008; Rodgers & Young, 2017). State violence has also been directed 
at illegal armed groups and their communities in the North and South-east of the country (often 
emerging from the Contra traditional constituencies), groups that are described by the media as 
‘bandits’. New legislation in 2005 on “sovereign security” has put the police and the military under 
direct command of the executive powers (Cuadra Lira, 2016a). Amnesty International has reported 
violence towards human rights indigenous Miskito activists in the Northern Autonomous regions 
(Amnestia Internacional Nicaragua, 2016). Dissent can come at a high price if it happens outside the 
spotlight. 
 
Nicaraguan politics as authoritarian populism? 
I find the concept ‘populism’ rather unhelpful. Everything and anything can be populist politics, with 
the exception of ideal (and seldom realised) pure class-based politics.  Like any nationalist politics, the 
Sandinista rhetoric revolves around the Nicaraguan ‘people’: el pueblo.  Ortega’s presidencial 
candidacy was sold as a way to make “el pueblo presidente”. A recent poster, clad in the new age pink 
aesthetics of the New Sandinismo, says este poder es del pueblo, este poder es Sandinista (this power 
is of the people, this power is Sandinista”).   
 
Populism, as any homogenising, ‘big-tent’ identity politics, is only as dangerous as it effaces social 
differences within ‘the people’, and if the degree of simplified reality portrayed by populism negates 
the realities of particular social groups and, by doing so, it makes them more vulnerable. In this regard, 
neosandinismo is a fascinating case because the laws that are in place (and are constantly updated and 
publicised in the media) and the public discourse celebrates social difference and the rights of the most 
vulnerable, but only the key legal mechanisms that are actually implemented are those that benefit the 
elites. What is left for the remaining citizenry is, at most, a safety net.  
 
Populism requires an ‘us vs. them’. There is an ‘othering’ in public discourse mostly looking 
outwards, in which imperialism and global capitalism is criticised. Yet interestingly, these tropes 
(which are cynical due to the government submission to the dictates of the IMF, the opening to foreign 
capital and the alliances with economic elites in the country) do not have real traction with their rural 
constituencies.  I did my year-long ethnographic fieldwork in a rural FSLN stronghold in the highlands 
of Matagalpa, yet anti-western or anti-capitalist sentiments were not replicated, rather the grassroots 
support was rooted in a vision of progress and ‘the common good’ and engaging in patriarchal 
relationships of reciprocity and obligation with the Sandinista government, embodied in the figure of 
Daniel (Cooper, 2015).  
 
In Nicaragua, the tense and precarious equilibrium of power is achieved through the transmission of 
power amongst different elite groups and the reactive force of the public. One of the policy experts 
interviewed visualised the Nicaraguan State as a set of groups with different degrees of increasing 
power and capacity to pressure the centre of power (Interview 3).  In the centre of power, a nucleo 
duro, a hard core of around 10 people (also called el anillo de acero, the steel ring) which includes 
Ortega and his wife and vice-president Murillo. Then a series of militant groups, including militant 
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businessmen (including important traders, historic militants (ex-commanders who yield significant 
symbolic power and appreciation by the public), young militants (the Sandinista youth) and lastly, the 
electorate.  
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of power and pressure in Nicaraguan politics 
 
It is important to highlight here that the nucleo duro of the FSLN is happy to feed the myth that 
circulates in which they are portrayed as having knowledge and control of all realms of life. The 
reality is different: their reach is sufficient for the reproduction and expansion of power, but there are 
spaces, particularly in the periphery, for emancipatory action. Despite top-down efforts to influence 
outcomes, municipal and grassroots politics have some room for manoeuvre outside the total control 
of the FSLN and are potential spaces for emancipatory politics (Interview 3). 
 
According to some of my informants, the Nicaraguan state is not solely a vehicle for reproduction of 
elite power and capture of economic gains of the Nicaraguan agro-export model. There seems- at least 
until now, before the lack of Venezuelan funds becomes apparent- to be a small space for the exercise 
of power towards the national interest (or what the hard core perceives to be in the general interest). 
This appears to be similar to authoritarian developmental states like Ethiopia or, seen in the best light, 
as a Deng Xiaping-esque “socialism with Nicaraguan characteristics” (Interview 3). The law 
regulating foreign direct investment, or the initial resistance of the hard core to the demands to 
introduce GM into the country by the business elites since 2006, indicate that there is, in some sense, 
room for manoeuvre for developmental state-type interventions. Unlike the previous liberal 
governments, the FSLN is not bound ideologically to neoliberalism, and hence have certain flexibility 
to pick and choose policies to do ‘whatever works’ (Interview 1, Interview 3). 
 
Section 2. The new rural political economy of Nicaragua: neoliberalism and the co-
option of agrarian movements  
A dual rural economy and agrarian populism 
The new FSLN rural policy is geared to maintain a dual rural economy. On the one side there is a 
large demographic of subsistence farmers who barely make a living producing undifferentiated 
commodities such as basic grains (corn, beans, sorghum, coffee), and sell cheaply to a large chain of 
intermediaries. On the other there are large-scale producers and traders, who, supported by the 
government, produce or extract high value commodities (mining, sugarcane, peanut, beef) or trade 
high volumes of basic grains wholesale in the international market (hence capturing most of its value 
added) (Banco Central de Nicaragua, 2016). This latter economy, represented by high-value (or 
Electorate
Young militants
Historic Militants
Business militants
Nucleo duro/ 
Hard core
Increased 
Power and 
increased 
pressure
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accumulated value in the case of grains) commodity exports is dominated by economic elites. As 
mentioned above, in the decades since the fall of the Sandinista revolution, many FSLN and Liberal 
party cadres and Contra commanders have joined these economic elites.  
 
The discourse of the government is agrarian populist in nature, claiming a general support for 
agricultural and food related livelihoods. Indeed, at first sight the policies seem to cater for both small-
scale farming and large scale farming and manufacturing. National “production plans” indeed 
incorporate “small-scale of the family economy” as well as catering for the needs of “Agro-exports” 
and “Agroindustry” (Gobierno de Reconciliacion y Unidad Nacional, 2017).  
 
Bias towards large-scale and plantation farmers 
Despite the agrarian populist discourse there is a significant bias towards large scale farming vis-à-vis 
small-scale farming, and towards agro-export ventures and Foreign Direct Investment rather than 
domestic production for national markets. Small scale farmers receive token development projects, but 
in their competition against large-scale farmers and traders, as a Central American saying goes, they 
are fighting a battle entre burro amarrado y tigre suelto (between a tied-up donkey and a loose tiger).  
 
This government bias towards the Nicaraguan agro-food elites is said to have been engendered and 
cemented by a ‘secret pact’ between the COSEP and the FSLN, a product of a series of closed door 
meetings in September 2013 (Montalvan, 2013). Under this pact, FSLN would actively support 
particular industries and protect them from legal or environmental investigation (mining and sugar 
cane, among others), and in return, the COSEP would work closely with the government and abstain 
from criticising it (Interview 4). A recent consequence of this alliance has been the elimination in 2017 
of the law that obliged investors to carry out Environmental Impact Analysis before starting their 
activities8.  
 
Latifundios, large scale farms over 350 hectares make up 19 percent of the total number of farms. 
There has been a concentration of large land ownership that has occurred has taken place in the sugar 
cane and palm oil sectors, as well as in the livestock sector, with capital inflows from wealthy 
Managuan elites and foreign direct investment (Baumeister, 2013). Land concentration has 
progressively taken place mostly in the Pacific and Centre regions, but the relative weight of small-
scale farmers has been sustained despite population increases due to the expansion of the agricultural 
frontier. The land area expanded from 8 million manzanas in 1978 to 10 million in 2017, mostly 
through deforestation (ibid). Small scale producers are the breadbasket of the country: small scale 
campesino families own 30 percent of the land, but produce 67 percent of food in the country (Salcedo 
& Guzmán, 2014: 59). 
 
Despite their significant importance both in number and in food production, there are significant 
policy biases in favour of relatively large-scale agricultural commodity producers and traders vis-à-vis 
small scale producers.  
 
Tax incentives are geared towards plantation and large-scale farming, and are based on conventional 
high input- high return form of farming with high agrochemical use. Either through economies of scale 
(in the case of tax cuts on agrochemical inputs) or on the level of mechanisation (tax cuts on 
machinery purchase, maintenance and parts), it is mostly the wealthy producers who benefit. 
Similarly, it is large-scale producers and traders who benefit from export tax incentives, whilst small 
scale farmers sell their crops (corn, beans, sorghum, coffee, etc.) at the lowest value to a large chain of 
intermediaries (SIMAS, 2012a).  
 
Credit is also biased towards large-scale farmers and wealthy traders. The government launched in 
2010 the ‘Bank for the promotion of production’, also called the Banco Produzcamos (Let’s Produce). 
The aim of this public-private financial partnership would be to channel funds into small and medium 
                                                 
8 Decree 15-2017, article 3.  
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producers with subsidised interest rates, farmers who could not afford or get loans at the market rates. 
The bank failed to create these preferential funds for small and medium enterprise, and ended up 
working as a private financial institution (Interview 7, Interview 8).  
 
As mentioned above, large scale producers and traders have direct communication (technical and 
political) with the government. Small and medium-scale farmer organisations (particularly those who 
advocate alternative agricultural models such as agroecology) are weak and underfunded, and do not 
have a space to voice their demands (Interview 9).  
 
Free trade and open doors to foreign investment, as mentioned above, are central to the new FSLN 
economic policy. Adherence to CAFTA has opened the door to some employment in Export 
Processing Zones, but also a permanent relegation of Nicaragua to an agricultural commodity 
exporting country (Interview 3). Most industrial/manufactured food products with value added often 
come from other Central American countries or the US. Even in terms of primary commodities, the 
exposure to free trade has left the rice sector exposed, and basic grain markets vulnerable highly 
vulnerable to slumps in price (SIMAS, 2012b; UPANIC, 2017). This exposure will be felt even more 
strongly when the ‘transition’ period (in which some degree of protection was allowed) finalises in 
2018. The ‘upside’ of openness is foreign investment in food and agriculture, although there has been 
little positive impact of this on the wide agrarian population. Walmart has purchased Pali and La 
Union, two of the main supermarket chains in the country. Cargill has purchased the entire value chain 
of broiler meat, including Tip Top restaurants, and imports corn from abroad rather than locally. Lala 
milk (including Eskimo ice-creams) was purchased by a Mexican capitalist, and has not enhanced 
quality production or offered higher prices to milk producers, but rather has engaged in watering down 
and mixing milks for profitability. The Nicaraguan government is offering Export Processing Zone 
status (with the implications on tax and labour conditions) to agricultural ventures including Palm Oil 
and Cocoa. The concession to the building of the Transoceanic Canal to the Chinese company HK-
Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Co. Limited is enabling major land grabs (often in 
indigenous territory) (Amnistia Internacional Nicaragua, 2017).  
 
Impacts and ‘double-think’ rural politics 
The social and environmental impact of the sugar cane industry is highly negative: soil erosion and 
contamination, air contamination due to sugar cane burning in the processing, river and underground 
water contamination with agrochemicals, health issues amongst workers and their communities (Renal 
Chronic Disease, intoxication and genetic mutations), unsustainable use of water, and competition 
with indigenous communities over land. Sugar cane production has rocketed under the FSLN 
leadership, upwards 44.6 percent since 2006 to 2015 (Sánchez Gutiérrez, Vásquez Zeledón, & Ripoll 
Lorenzo, 2017). The cultivation of the African Palm has generated large-scale adverse impacts in 
Nicaragua, among which are: the fragmentation of ecosystems, the loss and degradation of 
biodiversity; contamination of water sources; soil degradation, conflicts about land ownership and on 
occasion land grabs, and increase in poverty among communities (Sánchez Gutiérrez et al., 2017; 
Tittor, 2017). The peanut and tobacco industries have generated similar problems with agrochemical 
residues and dust-bowl-like erosion, as well as depleting water sources (as well as divesting water that 
should go into human consumption) (ibid).  
 
Added to this there is a push towards extractive industries such as mining and forestry. Since 2006 
gold mining has tripled in volume exported, and the value of forestry products has since doubled 
(Banco Central de Nicaragua, 2016). Mining has been responsible for deforestation and landscape 
change, contamination of water and soil with cyanide and heavy metals used in processing, health 
impact due to contamination of water, fish and other animals and loss of biodiversity (Montenegro 
Méndez, Reyes Martinez, & Chávez Nicoya, 2017). There are reports of intimidation and 
incarceration of community leaders protesting against mining (González, 2016).  
 
What is central to understanding the difficult balance that Nicaraguan’s authoritarian populism is 
striking is the double-think exercise that comes from simultaneously a progressive, inclusive and 
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environmentally friendly discourse and set of legislations, with the reality of environmental, health 
and social destruction that comes with unfettered agri-commodity and extractive industry expansion. 
What is striking is that the legislative apparatus to contain and redress unsustainable forms of 
production is already there: advanced environmental legislation, the law on food security and food 
sovereignty, social and political rights (e.g. indigenous rights). These progressive laws are in some 
cases not being implemented, as the law on food sovereignty and security, a ground-breaking law 
which incorporated issues such as the protection of local production and livelihoods, a focus on 
sustainable production, and public participation in policy making: none of the key government 
structures to implement the law are in place, 10 years after the law was passed. Other laws are being 
implemented unequally, as in the case of environmental law. A key witness in the project 
deliberations, a lawyer who worked for the Environmental Ombudsman office, established that 
Nicaragua leads in Central America in number of environmental laws and this legislation is adequate 
to respond to most environmental threats, but the problem is that the laws, either through lack of 
capacity, knowledge or political will, are applied unequally, particularly so when comparing between 
small and large-scale producers. Laws can also be contradictory, for example, the law on indigenous 
communities’ entitlement to communal land comes at the same time as expropriations and concessions 
of land to foreign investors (Amnistia Internacional Nicaragua, 2017).  
 
As part of the farmers’ jury deliberations, legislation was declared to be discriminatory: small scale 
farmers would be immediately reported for chopping down a tree in their farm to rebuild their house, 
whereas around them capitalists would buy huge plots of forested land and tear it down with no 
redress by the Ministry of Environment. Similarly plantations would contaminate soil and water 
without consequence. The jury reported that the popular law 717 to promote poor rural women to own 
arable land was not being implemented. Legislation did not mean implementation. Similarly 
agricultural policies are in their text a form of double think, their objective being: 
 
“To promote sustainable production that is friendly with nature, preserving and regenerating 
forests, conserving and regenerating water sources, making a rational use of water, and using 
inputs, fertilisers and pesticides in a way that they reduce the harm to the soil and protect 
biodiversity”(Gobierno de Reconciliacion y Unidad Nacional, 2017).  
 
The reality is precisely the opposite: tax breaks on agrochemicals and downmarket pressures on 
products incentivise industrialised forms of farming, national and foreign forestry investors carry on 
deforesting despite legislation against it, big plantations draw unsustainably on water resources, and 
the massive use of agrochemical and soil turning is killing agrobiodiversity (Sánchez Gutiérrez et al., 
2017).  
 
However, government messaging, unimplemented legislation and policy succeed in co-opting rural 
social movements. This is because it can claim that it is taking measures to address everyone’s needs. 
Through a ‘big tent’ politics, the government claims to not only address the needs of “agroindustry”, 
but also to the needs of small-scale farmers, as well as the agroecological movement. This is 
compounded by the roll-out of rural development programmes. Rodgers highlights how these 
programmes are highly visible, but not transformatory: 
 
[The] electoral primacy of the Sandinista party is ensured through the implementation of a 
plethora of highly targeted, small-scale social programmes (Martí i Puig, 2010; Rodgers, 2008, 
2011). These have involved the distribution of both in-kind donations—e.g. of food, roofing 
material, ovens, chickens, cows, bricks and mortars—as well as conditional cash transfers, but 
in all cases the scope of each of these different programmes is limited and rarely extends beyond 
5000 households (in a country that has over 300,000). There is moreover almost never any 
overlap between recipient households of different programmes. In a country that remains the 
second poorest in the Western hemisphere after Haiti, being a recipient of one of these 
programmes is extremely valued (…). (Rodgers & Young, 2017) 
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Similarly, the Ministry for Family, Community, Cooperative and Associative Economies (MEFCCA) 
also rolls out projects focused on small-scale sustainable or agroecological production, as well as 
reforestation: climate change adaptation projects for small-scale cocoa and coffee farmers, rural 
development (agriculture, fisheries and forestry) with indigenous communities in the Atlantic 
Autonomous Regions, programmes to link small-scale producers to value chains and enhancing 
market access, and cottage water catchment initiatives for farmers (Sánchez Gutiérrez et al., 2017). 
Both in terms of the impact and funds, these projects are a drop in the ocean compared to the political 
and economic bias towards extractives and large-scale conventional agriculture, but have translated in 
popular support in the countryside for the FSLN. 
 
The farmers jury engaged in the mentioned project, however, did point out some real positive 
elements of policy that have had an impact: (i) the explicit government support for agroecological or 
small-scale markets at the municipal level as well as in the heads of departamentos and Managua, (ii) 
the public grain company ENABAS is a good mechanism to market access for grain producers and 
subsidised food for poor consumers (and could potentially help in stopping price fluctuation if 
operations were larger), (iii) the bono productivo (Zero Hunger) which although of limited poverty 
impact it does enhance food security.  
 
Section 3. Shrinking political spaces for dissent in Nicaragua’s rural politics 
In the section above I have laid out how in Nicaragua there is a large gap between, on the one hand, 
the illusion of government narratives, legislation and policies: a powerful discourse that highlights 
political participation, social inclusion (of small-scale farmers, of indigenous peoples), and sustainable 
production, and, on the other hand, the reality of elite capture of natural resources and state benefits, 
land grabbing and concentration, widespread deforestation and. So far this ‘double think’ has been 
sustained by the provision of social safety nets and targeted development projects, and the hope that 
progressive legislation will indeed be implemented one day.  
 
However, both individuals, organisations and social movements who work in rural development in the 
past years have been progressively recognising and highlighting these contradictions, after perceiving 
the environmental and social damage first hand. The equilibrium breaks when people start calling out 
that the Emperor is ultimately naked (rather than in his new clothes) and when the safety nets and 
development programmes that generate public support fail. In Nicaragua, the reality on the ground in 
rural areas is showing the true nature of the agro-export and extractive economy, and simultaneously, 
the Venezuelan funds, that support safety net programmes, have dwindled. A trend towards 
authoritarianism is what follows when this equilibrium is broken. 
 
This increase in authoritarianism in the realm of rural change, has translated into a shrinking space for 
dissent, where the government sees necessary to drown out the voices who point out the contradictions 
of the FSLN model of politics. Researchers and rural NGOs are no longer able to voice their dissent. 
There is a fear that criticising the government might translate into ostracism.  
 
“Rural social movements have been progressively debilitated by the fear of being contradicted, 
people are afraid of giving their opinion. When you are in a workspace, such as an NGO, there 
is fear that you might be kicked out. In the government, the government workers are under even 
worse strain. (…) producers, are now fearful to crate controversy, they measure what they say 
and they speak in a low volume, particularly those linked to the municipalities. Those who are 
most critical are have been progressively marginalised. People are starting a culture of self-
censorship.” (Interview 2) 
 
At an individual level, the FSLN has institutionalised the aval, a FSLN letter of endorsement in order 
to seek either public service jobs at any level or government support. For those who might seek to 
work for the State at some point, voicing dissent is not an option. Foreigners feel that voicing their 
dissent might mean they lose their residency rights. Rural organisations are also very careful not to 
voice dissent, since the aval system has expanded to the NGO and Association level. If any 
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organisation wishes to work in a project where the government is a development partner (a very 
common occurrence), they will require an institutional aval.  
 
“Its public knowledge, (…) the government [secretly] classifies NGOs into ‘allies’ and the 
‘black list’. People fear ending up blacklisted. You are considered an enemy if you are critical 
or put things into question. We end up doing diplomacy to ensure you are liked. It’s becoming a 
culture.” (Interview 2) 
 
Most of my interviewees have highlighted that this pressure has impeded people from many rural 
organisations to be overtly critical of the government. The field of food and agricultural policy and 
research, which had been so rich a decade ago, is progressively being abandoned because of fear of 
reprisals. Two policy experts I interviewed indicated that agricultural research organisations are 
stopping their funds in policy research and advocacy (Interview 1, Interview 6). As I mentioned above, 
some academics and policy researchers I approached felt unable to co-author this paper, and on 
occasions when researchers do publish on issues related to agrarian change, they partially self-censor 
and reword their articles to ensure they are not being ‘politically sensitive’. What is considered 
‘politically sensitive’ and hence cannot be spoken of has been progressively increasing since 2006. 
 
The FSLN leadershiop sends signals when a topic cannot be addressed, and staff from the relevant 
Ministries indicate what issues may be politically sensitive. Most recently, as I mentioned above, the 
FSLN has given into the longstanding demand by the economic elites to allow GM crop cultivation in 
the country. I say given into, because the UPANIC has been advocating for GM entry since before 
2007, when the law of food security and food sovereignty was being debated in the Nicaraguan 
parliament. Nicaragua had been successful in being the only Central American country without GM 
crops. Now the nucleo duro has finally approved the introduction of GM crops, and the National Plan 
for Production, Consumption and Trade 2017-18 contemplates the introduction of experimental plots  
(Gobierno de Reconciliacion y Unidad Nacional, 2017). In one conference on rural development and 
sustainable forms of production, speakers, who included producers and activists in the agroecological 
movement were ‘nudged’ to tone down their anti-GM messages. 
 
The consequences of resisting these nudges can be extremely harsh. The FENACOOP (national 
federation of agricultural and agro-industrial cooperatives), an association of 420 cooperatives, most 
of them Sandinistas, was closed down by the government after its leader, himself a Sandinista, was 
overtly critical of the government (Envio, 2015). The organisation was (some say falsely) accused of 
delays in payments of Austrian project funds and closed down.  A group of men belonging to the 
MEFCCA forcefully occupied the building and changed the locks (ibid). The example of FENACOOP 
is said to be flagged to potential dissidents, when they consider criticising current rural policy 
(Interview 2, Interview 7, Interview 8). Due to the ‘real FSLN’ policy is not clear (emerging from the 
‘double think’ contradictions above, but also the way the FSLN has steered in different directions, 
such as in the case of GM) this has created an paralysing atmosphere of uncertainty. FSLN leaders at 
the grassroots nor other relevant actors in rural development no longer know what they are allowed to 
say or not to say, and thus refrain from speaking their minds in public about the environmental and 
social crisis that comes with the current Nicaraguan model. 
 
In the face of of land dispossession, social discrimination and environmental degradation, dissent is 
inevitable. The government or non-state agents (allowed by the government) have purchased (legally 
or in dubious circumstances) or expropriated land (on several occasions indigenous) for the cultivation 
of Palm and Sugar cane in the East of the country (Baumeister, 2013; Interview 7). Other communities 
have been facing the health effects of agrochemicals (e.g. in the sugar cane communities of the North-
west) and mining. Some activists feel that they can still speak ‘if they change their message’ and are 
not too confrontational, but the reality is that peaceful protest movements have been met with 
incarceration, harassment and violence (González, 2016; Montenegro Méndez et al., 2017). This was 
made particularly obvious for the future construction (if it ever does materialise) of the transoceanic 
canal, in which vast amounts of land were expropriated (Amnistia Internacional Nicaragua, 2017). 
This expropriation, added to the mass environmental impact that such a mega-project would entail, 
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sparked dozens of protests against the country. Violence was used against environmental protestors, 
targeted violence by the police, and counter-demonstrations were organised. In these tailored clashes, 
the Sandinista Youth used violence to disturb the protests. 
 
Even harsher violence is targeted towards the handful of disgruntled militia-men which are rearming 
in the North (in areas traditionally of Contra support who felt somewhat represented by liberal 
municipal councillors, yet these municipalities have now fallen in the hands of the FSLN). These ‘re-
armados’ are described by the media as ‘bandits’ or ‘drug-traffickers’ (never as ‘armed groups’), and 
they and their communities have witnessed direct military violence and repression (Cerda, 2017).  
 
“The army steals lands and production from the campesino, he arms himself and then the army 
comes round and kill them. The army has engaged in land grabbing, using thousands of MZ to 
plant. If campesinos don’t sell land to them, they take it away. (…) People have had enough. 
They are not criminals or bandits, it is just a product of the contradiction between the 
agricultural model and public policies.” (Interview 7) 
 
Conclusion. Neosandinista authoritarian populism and the future of emancipatory rural 
politics 
When describing Nicaragua’s new politics, it makes sense to speak of a contemporary form of 
Caudillismo, based on the delicate balance between on the one hand, elite alliances and resource and 
market capture, and on the other, sufficient public support. Public support in the rural areas is enabled 
by two means: first, through discourse, through the control of socialist rhetoric messages in the media, 
and secondly, the design and promotion of progressive (in environmental and social terms) legislation 
and policies.  Populism is indeed an important factor, inasmuch as the FSLN uses a ‘big tent politics’ 
in which the government claims to be addressing the interests of all Nicaraguan citizens. Agricultural 
business, small-scale farmers, sustainable producers, indigenous communities, and so on, are all 
supposedly incorporated into the FSLN’s notion of progress.  Whilst there are some genuinely 
universalist policies, for example free healthcare and education, and the roll-out of safety nets, the 
reality is that State support is biased towards the economic and political elites. 
 
The balance is being broken by the contradictions that are emerging between the socialist rhetoric and 
legislation and the reality that people face in the ground. Authoritarianism emerges as a response to 
these contradictions and those who identify them, rather than as a primary objective. Authoritarianism 
is enacted when the impact of the destructive economic model and the reality of legislative bias is 
voiced and protested against:  ultimately when the brand of Nicaragua as a ‘safe business-friendly 
environment’ is jeopardised.  
 
My concern is that in Nicaragua the contradictions are most likely to keep emerging in two fronts: the 
environmental, economic and social impact of the economic model will be too obvious to ignore, and 
secondly, the safety nets and sustainable development programmes are less likely to be funded in the 
future. In terms of impact, the transition period for CAFTA finishes in 2018, hence the rural poor and 
SMEs will feel the full-blow of free trade (UPANIC, 2017). The Venezuelan preferential commodity 
market collapsed, so the ALBA trade routes will not make up for this. The impact of deforestation, 
contamination and land-grabs will continue to be witnessed directly by the population. Landlessness 
will become more obvious, as the agricultural frontier is finally depleted (and hence there is no more 
arable land to be claimed from the forest). In terms of safety nets and sustainable agriculture projects, 
the lack of Venezuelan funds is already patent and subsidised food or Zero Hunger programmes will 
disappear or shift from grants to loans. The new reality will leave the FSLN leadership at a crossroads, 
either veering further towards authoritarianism, or alternatively shifting the balance of power to truly 
represent traditional FSLN constituencies: rural and urban poor, small-scale farmers, ‘squeezed middle 
class’. 
 
The role for an emancipatory rural politics is to push for this shift in power, through mobilising these 
traditional constituencies, and highlighting the contradictions of the economic model. As mentioned in 
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the model (figure 1), the ‘public’ does have an effective peripheral degree of control over the FSLN 
nucleo duro, provided it flexes its muscle. Despite discourses of absolute control, there is room for 
manouver in the margins, through work in the municipalities and the community level. As advocated 
by the Nicaraguan farmers jury (Sánchez Gutiérrez et al., 2017), a grassroots social movement can 
also work within the existing legal framework to build cases against situations in which legislation that 
is not being implemented (e.g. working with the Federal Attorney's Office for Environmental 
Protection). There are positive past experiences in which EPZ have been closed down in the past by a 
civil society organisation based on environmental and health and safety grounds (Interview 3). This 
grassroots movement is the only alternative, as a change of party in power is unlikely to shift elite 
dominance or improve the rural situation in Nicaragua (rather the opposite, if history is any 
indication). 
 
We must beware of the unintended consequences of the past acts of authoritarianism. There has been 
de-legitimation of democratic process, and opposition forces may no longer see democratic elections 
as a channel to voice dissent.  Right-wing young activists might dabble in violent direct action, which 
could potentially create an explosive situation such as that in Venezuela. A progressive grassroots 
social movement has to emerge to transform new Sandinista politics now, or otherwise it may be too 
late. 
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